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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to examine the effects of peer ethical behavior and individual differences in
valuation of fairness vs loyalty on whistleblowing intentions in academic settings. This study also tests the
underlying mechanism responsible for the effects of peer behavior on reporting intentions, namely, fear of
reprisal.
Design/methodology/approach – A survey was conducted with 947 undergraduate students. The
model was tested using ordinary least squares regression models followed by bootstrapped mediation
analyses.
Findings – Results showed that the effects of peer ethical behavior on whistleblowing intentions are
mediated by fear of retaliation. Moreover, the findings indicated that, for low-severity transgressions, there is
an interactive effect between fear of retaliation and endorsement of fairness over loyalty on whistleblowing
intentions.
Research limitations/implications –When the misconduct is seen as minor, a potential whistleblower
may understand that the expected costs outweigh the possible benefits of blowing the whistle. In such
situations, higher fear of retaliation would undermine the effects of individual’s endorsement of fairness over
loyalty on reporting intentions.
Practical implications – As the social environment significantly affects someone’s whistleblowing
intentions, there should be visible efforts to improve and to foster an ethical infrastructure in organizations.
Social implications – As fear of retaliation by peers is one of the most important determinants affecting
the decision to report misconduct in general, there must be serious efforts from leaders to mitigate any threat
of retaliation to those who come forward.
Originality/value – This work contributes to the discussion about individual and situational antecedents
of whistleblowing. More importantly, it sheds light on one potential boundary condition for the influence of
the fairness–loyalty tradeoff on whistleblowing decisions: severity of the transgression. The findings provide
initial evidence that, for low-severity transgressions, fear of retaliation weakens the positive effects of one’s
moral compass in terms of preference for fairness over loyalty on whistleblowing intentions.
Keywords Whistleblowing, Peer behavior, Retaliation, Fairness, Loyalty
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Whistleblowers play a central role in uncovering frauds and organizational wrongdoing in
general. Recent data from cases of occupational fraud in companies shows that tips provided
by individuals who observe misconduct are responsible for the detection of half of the cases
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of frauds perpetrated in Latin America (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2020).
Moreover, by reporting misconduct in place, whistleblowers can help organizations to avoid
financial losses (e.g. employee embezzlement), lawsuits filed (e.g. employee discrimination or
moral assault cases) and reputational damages (Near & Miceli, 2016). In the fiscal year of
2017, whistleblowers helped to recover almost $4bn in fraudulent charges in the USA (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2017). Given its importance, understanding the factors that encourage
or prevent individuals from reporting observed unethical conduct is of critical importance to
theory and practice on ethics. Identifying these factors may have concrete consequences in
the formulation of practical organizational policies that may promote whistleblowing.
Although some consider the act of whistleblowing to be driven by a sense of moral duty
(Watts & Buckley, 2017) and others compare whistleblowers to saints (Avakian & Roberts,
2012), individuals who decide to blow the whistle are more likely to be seen as rats than
heroes by members of their communities (Grant, 2002). Because of the many personal risks
they undergo by deciding to report misconduct, many individuals choose to remain silent
(Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & Edmondson, 2009; Morrison, 2014), which raises the
question of what leads some individuals to blow the whistle while others do not.
To tackle this issue, extant research has been arguing for the role of individual and
contextual determinants in the decision to report unethical conduct. Regarding individual
factors, studies have investigated the role of demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age
and education) in whistleblowing (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Mesmer-Magnus &
Viswesvaran, 2005) as well as the influence of other personal characteristics such as
personality traits (Culiberg & Mihelic, 2017) and value orientations (Park, Blenkinsopp, &
Park, 2014). About situational factors, studies have focused on characteristics of the
wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 1996) or the organizational context, such as organizational
culture and climate (Kaptein, 2011), threat of retaliation (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran,
2005) and supervisor and coworker support (Mayer, Nurmohamed, Treviño, Shapiro, &
Schminke, 2013). This literature has shown that both individual and situational factors are
determinants in whistleblowing (some argue that more on intentions than on effective
decisions to act), but there is also sound evidence that situational variables tend to be more
influential than individual ones (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Mesmer-Magnus &
Viswesvaran, 2005, for a meta-analytic review; Near & Miceli, 1996). In Brazil, the literature
on corporate whistleblowing has focused on the importance of cultural aspects (Behrens,
2015; Sampaio & Sobral, 2013). Building on this tradition of explaining human behavior as
the result of personal and contextual variables, this work aims to investigate the joint effects
of the individual’s moral values and the immediate social environment in which he or she
is embedded. More specifically, we examine individual differences in preferences for fairness
vs loyalty and peer ethical behavior on intentions to blow the whistle in academic settings.
In our view, this topic has not been dealt in depth by the aforementioned literature.
Moreover, we explore the mediating effect of fear of retaliation on the relationship between
peer behavior andwhistleblowing.
We chose to investigate whistleblowing in academic environment, specifically among
undergraduate students in a private college, because fraud is a pervasive problem at most
academic institutions (MacGregor & Stuebs, 2014; McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001)
and it may lead to the normalization of unethical behavior in other domains (Fida,
Tramontano, Paciello, Ghezzi, & Barbaranelli, 2018). Furthermore, some suggest that
misconduct in vocational education can influence future ethical behavior at the workplace
(McCabe, Butterfield, & Trevino, 2012). Although this work does not aim at focusing on
the specificities of academic whistleblowing as compared to other environments, the




In this paper, we analyze less severe misconducts – such as cheating during exams and
signing presence list for others – but also very severe ones – such as bribing employees to
access exam content in advance and hacking the academic system for personal gains.
Within this scope, this paper provides the following contributions. First, we add to the
discussion of academic dishonesty by examining the influence of individual and situational
antecedents of whistleblowing not already tested in academic settings, namely, peer
behavior (in our case, students) and valuations of fairness vs loyalty. Moreover, by including
fear of retaliation in our analysis, our work sheds light on the psychological mechanism by
which the immediate social environment influences the decision to blow the whistle or not.
Additionally, we extend literature on whistleblowing by investigating how fear of reprisal
from one’s peers may interact with valuations of fairness vs loyalty on whistleblowing
intentions.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Peer behavior and fear of retaliation
Given the central importance of whistleblowing, defined as the “disclosure by organization
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of
their employees, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near &
Miceli, 1985, p. 4), much work has been done to identity conditions under which
whistleblowing is more likely to occur. In the literature of behavioral ethics in general, the
social environment has been identified as one of the most powerful forces in fostering ethical
conduct (Tenbrunsel & Chugh, 2015). In academic settings, although many contextual
factors may play a role (such as honor code, sanctions and monitoring systems), peer
behavior (i.e. other students’ behavior) is considered one key determinant to explain
academic cheating (McCabe, Butterfield, & Treviño, 2006). This is because much of the
learning occurs via vicarious processes, that is, people do not have to be directly reinforced
to learn behaviors; rather, they learn through the observations of others’ behaviors
(Bandura, 1986). Thus, when observing others cheating and getting ahead, individuals are
more likely to display the same cheating behavior. By the same token, if individuals see
whistleblowers suffering reprisal for speaking up, then whistleblowing should be less likely
to occur.
Additionally, not only individuals use peers as potential role models for their own
behavior, but they also observe others to gather signals and cues of what is considered
appropriate. As such, peer ethical behavior may also provide normative support for
whistleblowing decisions. Consistent with it, social information processing theory (Salancik
& Pfeffer, 1978) suggests that under conditions of uncertainty about acceptable behavior,
individuals look for cues about what to do in their social environment. According to the
authors, the social context provides valuable information about what behaviors, attitudes
and opinions one should display and follow. Actors from the immediate social circle, such as
coworkers and immediate supervisors, exert particularly important influence because
individuals are motivated to follow and agree with their peers to fit in. In line with this
reasoning, Mayer et al. (2013) have found support for the joint effects of leader and peer
ethical behavior on employees’willingness to report unethical conduct in work environment.
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize the following:
H1. Peer ethical behavior is positively related to whistleblowing intentions.
Despite the many organizational benefits associated with whistleblowing, almost half of the
individuals aware of misconduct remain silent (Fredin, 2012). That number is not surprising




Miceli, 2016). The literature on voice and silence presents consistent evidence that a safety
calculus is crucial to the decision of voice and silence (Morrison, 2014). Extant research has
shown that most whistleblowers face some form of retaliation from colleagues or
supervisors after disclosing misconduct (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Park,
Bjørkelo, & Blenkinsopp, 2020). For instance, Rothschild and Miethe (1999) identified a
retaliation rate of nearly two-thirds among actual whistleblowers, ranging frommore formal
undesirable actions against the person who speak up (such as termination, demotion,
unfavorable job performance evaluations, involuntary transfer, assignment of
unmanageable tasks and professional blacklisting) to more informal and unofficial ones (e.g.
social ostracism and bullying).
Given the potential threats of blowing the whistle, individuals may choose for what has
been called defensive silence, a type of silence driven by the fear of the anticipated negative
consequences for the self (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). Such fear is triggered by cues in one’s
environment signaling the existence of some threat. According to the informal rules and
norms of the group about how to deal with misconduct from one of its members (Trevino &
Victor, 1992), individuals then may choose to withhold information regarding another
person’s misconduct. In this line of reasoning, the immediate social environment in which
the person is embedded may activate the fear of being punished for speaking up. For
instance, Mayer et al. (2013) have found evidence that, in work environments, the effects of
supervisory ethical leadership and coworker behavior on reporting unethical conduct
internally occur via fear of retaliation.
Although work-related retaliation (such as terminations or demotions) is absent in
academic settings, whistleblowers may still face ostracism, name-calling and other forms of
social sanctions from their academic peers. For these reasons, if individuals perceive their
academic peers as more ethical, they will be less likely to be perceived as a snitch or a
tattletale. Also, they will feel less threatened to be reprimanded by the group and that will
increase their likelihood of engaging in voice. As such, fear of retaliation may be the
underlying mechanism by which peer behavior influence whistleblowing intentions in
academic environment. Following this, we expected that:
H2. The effect of peer ethical behavior on whistleblowing intentions is mediated by fear
of retaliation.
2.2 Interplay between the whistleblower’s dilemma and the social environment
When deciding whether or not to disclosure another person’s misconduct, individuals face
what has been called thewhistleblower’s dilemma (Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013), in which
two important moral values, namely, fairness and loyalty, may be in conflict. Although both
values guide people in judging whether a behavior is appropriate or not (Graham et al., 2011;
Hildreth, Gino, & Bazerman, 2016), they clash when it comes to whistleblowing decisions.
While norms of fairness require treating everyone equally, loyalty norms entail preferential
treatment for in-group members over others. In whistleblowing decisions, by reporting
other’s misdeeds, individuals are acting in the name of justice and the benefit of the society
more broadly. But at the same time, their act may be considered a betrayal to the closer
group. As such, there is a tradeoff between concerns regarding the well-being of one’s
immediate group and concerns for the well-being of others that goes beyond one’s group
(Dungan, Young, &Waytz, 2019). As Dungan, Waytz, and Young (2015, p. 129) put it: “from
one perspective, whistleblowing is the ultimate act of justice, serving to right a wrong. From




Extant evidence has shown that loyalty leads to corruption in some domains (Hildreth
et al., 2016) as well as prior research has found that the endorsement of fairness over loyalty
is positively associated with whistleblowing in general (Waytz et al., 2013). In this paper, we
aim to test the effects of this whistleblowing dilemma on willingness to report wrongdoing in
academic settings. Moreover, we are not aware of empirical studies testing the interplay
between the fairness-loyalty tradeoff and the fear of reprisal in whistleblowing intentions.
Examining this interactive effect would be important, because the effects of the endorsement
of fairness over loyalty on whistleblowing decisions may depend on the degree to which one
fears being socially reprimanded by their peers. For instance, prior work has provided
evidence that the risk of exclusion from the group predicts employees’ engagement in pro-
group unethical behavior (Thau, Derfler-Rozin, Pitesa, Mitchell, & Pillutla, 2015).
Although some people value fairness more than loyalty to a group, social inclusion is an
important universal need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), which means that to a certain degree
everyone cares about affiliation to a group and their inclusionary status in the group.
Therefore, we posit that fear of retaliation can suppress the positive effect of preference for
fairness over loyalty norms in whistleblowing intentions. Based on the aforementioned
arguments, we hypothesize the following:
H3. The preference for fairness over loyalty is positively related to whistleblowing
intentions.
H4. There is an interactive effect of preference for fairness over loyalty and fear of
retaliation on whistleblowing intentions such that the effect of preference for




Data for analysis were gathered from a sample of students from a Brazilian business school.
We targeted this sample for two reasons. First, we intended to examine antecedents of
whistleblowing intentions in academic environment. Also, we chose business students
because prior research has shown that they cheat more than their nonbusiness-student peers
(McCabe et al., 2006). Students from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd years of the courses were invited to
participate in the study as volunteers. They were informed that the study was of a scientific
nature and they would not be identified at any time, as the data collected was anonymous.
Out of 1,076 participants, 41% were freshmen and 32% were female. The mean age was
19.6 years old (standard deviation= 1.6 years). A total of 32 participants did not complete
the entire survey. The final sample was of 947.
3.2 Measures
Fairness-loyalty trade-off. The first measure was based on the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). On a six-point scale, six items were used to assess
participants’ opinions about the importance of fairness and loyalty for their judgments of
right and wrong. Sample items included: “whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty”
and “whether or not someone had his or her rights denied.”We computed a composite values
score by averaging the three fairness items and the three loyalty items separately and then
subtracting the loyalty score from the fairness score. The resulting values were




standard deviation 1. The higher the score, the more an individual values fairness over
loyalty.
Peer ethical behavior (“Peers”). We used three items adapted from Mayer et al. (2013) to
assess peer ethical behavior. A sample item is: “my peers support me in following my
school’s standards of ethical behavior.”We averaged the three items to compute the “Peers”
score. All items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree and
7= strongly agree).
Fear of retaliation (“Ret”). Two items adapted from Mayer et al. (2013) were used to
assess fear of retaliation on a seven-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree and
7= strongly agree): “if I report a dishonesty act, I will be seen as a snitch by my peers” and
“if I report a dishonesty act, I will be seen as a trouble-maker by my peers.”We averaged the
two items to compute the “Ret” score.
Whistleblowing intentions. To assess willingness to blow the whistle, eight scenarios of
academic cheating with different levels of severity adapted fromMcCabe and Trevino (1993)
were presented to participants. For each situation, respondents indicated their
whistleblowing intentions on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very
likely).
For each scenario, participants were also asked how likely they would be to blow the
whistle if the transgressor was: “an acquaintance you barely interact” or “a close friend.”We
averaged all the 16 responses (2 different transgressors for 8 different scenarios) to compute
an overall whistleblowing score (“OWS”). An exploratory factor analysis with varimax
rotation was used to uncover whether respondents perceived differently the seven cheating
behaviors. The analysis yielded a two-factor solution with 77% of explanation of the total
variance of the data. Items were retained if they loaded higher than 0.50 on a single factor.
As Table 1 indicates, the two factors distinguish between high (factor 1) and low (factor 2)
severity transgressions. For this reason, we also computed a whistleblowing score for high
(“HWS”) and low (“LWS”) severity transgressions.
Control variable. Research has shown that not only is moral disengagement a strong
predictor of a myriad of unethical behaviors (Moore, 2015; Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, &






Item 1 2 Communalities Mean SD
Bribing a reprography employee to gain access to the
exam in advance
0.937 0.059 0.880 3.96 1.96
Leaking the test content to other students 0.872 0.201 0.800 3.31 1.92
Hacking the absentee system to tamper with class
attendance list
0.841 0.269 0.780 3.07 1.83
Hiring someone to solve tests and assignments in your
place
0.817 0.290 0.752 3.52 1.99
Fully plagiarizing a course assignment found on the
internet
0.595 0.631 0.753 2.50 1.51
Cheating during an exam 0.390 0.783 0.765 2.30 1.51
Signing a presence list as a colleague who is not present 0.080 0.907 0.829 1.76 1.40
Putting his/her name in a group assignment that he/she
did not participate in
0.332 0.708 0.611 2.63 1.70
% explanation 45.4 31.7 77.1




(Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007). Thus, we controlled for it using the 24-item moral
disengagement propensity measure (“MD”) from Detert, Treviño, and Sweitzer (2008) on a
seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree and 7= strongly agree).
Figure 1 represents the expected relations among the variables as specified by our
hypotheses. The letter y stands for the whistleblowing score (OWS, HWS or LWS).
3.3 Statistical model
Based on Figure 1 and using MD as a control variable, we estimated regression models to
measure the effects of “Peers,” “Ret” and “FL,” and the interaction (moderation) effect
between “Ret” and “FL” over the “OWS,” “HWS” and “LWS.” The coefficients of the models
are associated with the connections illustrated in Figure 1. We also evaluated the effect of
“Peers” over “Ret” using “MD” as a control variable. The econometric models are given by
y ¼ b 0 þ b 1 Peersþ b 2 Ret þ b 3 FLþ b 4 Ret*FLþ b 5 MDþ « 1; (1)
Ret ¼ a0 þ a1 Peersþ a2 MDþ « 2; (2)
where y denotes the dependent variable (OWS, HWS or LWS), b and a are the parameters
of the models and « 1 and «1 represent the errors of the models. Because of the large sample
size (947) results by an ordinary least squares estimation of these parameters are robust to
the lack of normality of the errors. To control for heteroscedasticity, we used Huber–
Whites’s robust standard errors.
The evaluations of the indirect effect of “Peer” over “OWS,” “HWS” and “LWS” were
based on bootstrap estimates of the 95% confidence interval of the conditional indirect
effects of peers over whistleblowing score variables for 16th, 50th and 84th percentile of FL.
For each interval, 50,000 bootstrap samples were drawn.
To estimate and analyze our moderated mediation model, we used the computational
routines provided in Hayes’ PROCESS macro [see Hayes (2017) for a more detailed review of
the statistical treatment], which is appropriate for mediation analysis and widely used to
examine psychological processes (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011).
4. Results
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models are shown in Table 2. As expected,
the intention to report tends to be higher, in general terms, for HWS than for LWS. “Peers”
and “Ret” have mean and median closer to the highest value of the scale (7) than to the
lowest (1), indicating a strong presence of these two characteristics in the sample. The







Table 3 describes the estimated models. The effects of “Peers” and “FL” over the
whistleblowing scores were positive and significant (p< 0.05); the positive signs supportH1
and H3. The moderation effect between Ret and FL was significant only for LWS
(p=0.0240), which is coherent withH4.
To test H2, Table 4 presents the bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect peer
mediation effect. Except for the lowest values of FL for the LWS model, the intervals do not
contain the value 0, which do not contradictH2.
5. Discussion and theoretical and practical implications
This work aimed to investigate the effects of individual and situational factors on
whistleblowing intentions. Specifically, we examined the combined effects of peer ethical
behavior and individual differences in preferences for fairness vs loyalty on whistleblowing
intentions. Furthermore, we tested the mediating role of fear of retaliation in the relationship
between peer behavior andwhistleblowing.
Our results provided support for the aforementioned relationships. Consistent with prior
studies in organizational contexts, we found that peers’ ethical behavior (Mayer et al., 2013)
and the preference of fairness over loyalty (Waytz et al., 2013) have a positive impact on
whistleblowing intentions. Moreover, in line with social information processing theory
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) and previous studies on silence in corporate settings (Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Morrison, 2014; Park et al., 2020), we found that peers’
behavior on whistleblowing intentions is mediated by fear of retaliation. Finally, we found
support for the interplay between preference for fairness over loyalty and fear of retaliation
on willingness to blow the whistle.
Yet, it is worth noting some important differences in the moderation effects that
were found. Although it was not the primary objective of this work, our results provide
initial evidence that the joint effects of the fairness–loyalty tradeoff and the fear of
reprisal depend on the severity of transgression. For low-severity transgressions, the
positive effect of preference for fairness over loyalty on whistleblowing intentions is
weakened by the perceived risk of being retaliated by peers. However, the interactive
effect is not observed for high-severity transgressions neither for the overall
whistleblowing score. These results can be explained by a cost–benefit analysis, in
which the whistleblower weighs the economic and psychological outcomes of speaking
up (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003). When the misconduct is seen as minor, a
potential whistleblower may understand that the expected costs (social and work-
related retaliations) outweigh the possible benefits of blowing the whistle. In such
situations, higher fear of retaliation would undermine the effects of individual’s
endorsement of fairness over loyalty in reporting intentions. This is consistent with
past research that relates characteristics of the wrongdoing, specifically severity, with
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics
for the variables of
the models
Variables Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
OWS 2.88 2.75 1.33 1.00 6.94
HWS 3.46 3.25 1.72 1.00 7.00
LWS 2.23 1.83 1.29 1.00 7.00
Peers 5.00 5.33 1.40 1.00 7.00
Ret 4.79 5.00 1.90 1.00 7.00
Unstandardized FL 0.68 0.67 1.03 3.33 4.67








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the choice to blow the whistle (Culiberg & Mihelic, 2017; Mesmer-Magnus &
Viswesvaran, 2005; Near & Miceli, 1985, 1996). The less salient the wrongdoing, the
less likely it is for people to speak up against it. Salience can be lower because ethical
erosion happens gradually (Gino & Bazerman, 2009) or because of the low perceived
seriousness of the wrongdoing, for instance. Likewise, the moral intensity literature
(Jones, 1991) indicates that there is a positive relationship between magnitude of
consequences of the wrongdoing and reporting intent (Chen & Lai, 2014). Additionally,
individuals are motivated to maintain a positive sense of self (Sumanth, Mayer, & Kay,
2011). As such, those who value fairness more than loyalty are more willing to blow
the whistle because that is the “right thing to do.” Therefore, if they decide not to blow
the whistle because of fear of retaliation, such action would damage their positive self-
image because that would be inconsistent with their values. To avoid such negative
feelings, individuals may engage in self-deception to convince themselves that their
decision to remain silent is not morally questionable. That is, they need to rationalize
this cognitive dissonance between attitude and behavior (Festinger, 1957; Latan,
Chiappetta Jabbour, & Lopes de Sousa Jabbour, 2019). For low-severity transgressions,
that internal justification would be easier because the misconduct is less serious.
Curiously, our empirical results corroborate many of the propositions posed by
Sampaio and Sobral (2013). According to their theoretical model about whistleblowing
in Brazil, attitude toward whistleblowing is influenced by the seriousness of the
wrongdoing and fear of retaliation, among other factors.
What are the implications of this all? As the social environment significantly affects
someone’s whistleblowing intentions, there should be visible efforts to improve and to
foster ethical infrastructure (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003). That applies
either to academic and corporate settings. In regards to the academic environment, it
must be embedded in a climate that truly supports ethical behavior by its members
(Chaudhary, Gupta, & Phoolka, 2019). Higher ranking members (professors, directors,
head of departments, etc.) must be straightforward in dealing with ethical wrongdoings,
being these of low or high severity (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009). The message must
be clear that transgressions will not be tolerated, no matter its gravity, and that reports
on any type of dishonest behavior will receive full support. As such, universities must
relentlessly express – in words, actions and decisions from higher ranking members and
professors, employees, etc. – that ethical behavior is expected and demanded from all
members of the community. It must explicitly offer incentives and recognition to those
who act according to the code of ethics. Also, directors and professors must emphasize –
as much and as clear as it is possible – that retaliation to whistleblowers will not be
accepted.
Our findings also have managerial implications. As we have shown, and very much
in line with the previous literature, the fear of retaliation is one of the most important
determinants – alone or as a mediator – affecting the decision to voice or silence. Thus,
there must be permanent and serious efforts from managers and leaders to mitigate
any threat of retaliation to those who come forward and denounce wrongdoings. This
is a difficult task because many times, retaliation is informal and unofficial and hard to
detect (Bjørkelo, 2013). In other cases, even worse, it is part of official measures (Park
et al., 2020). Some distressing results were found in this sense by Dyck, Morse, and
Zingales (2010): they analyzed 216 cases of whistleblowing in big corporations and
found that in 82% of the cases in which the whistleblower did not conceal his/her
identity, the blower was fired, quit under duress or had significantly altered




and often to another town to escape personal harassment” (Dyck et al., 2010, pp. 2240–
2245). Certainly, this ruins any attempt to create an ethical organizational climate.
Managers should act as ethical leaders (Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000) and send a
clear message that employees who decide to speak up will be fully supported.
Additionally, leaders can encourage open discussions among their subordinates about
the tensions many of them might feel when attempting to balance loyalty and fairness
demands (Dungan et al., 2019). The more open and candid the discussion about these
moral conflicts, the clearer the message about which behavior is appropriate when
facing these ethical dilemmas.
In any context, creating the incentives and norms for members to speak up must be an
exercise which combines societal, legal and organizational effort, in which this last one has a
crucial role. Yet, as Bjørkelo (2013) poses, many organizations are still unprepared for this
task. Universities are not different.
6. Limitations and future research
Some limitations of this study should be addressed. This paper analyzed whistleblowing
intentions within undergraduate students. One limitation is the sample of respondents: all
members of a private university in Brazil. Even in the context of higher education, these
students had little variance in terms of social background, age, preferences and ideologies.
We were also unable to measure the extent of some group factors that may affect
whistleblowing intentions, such as group cohesion (Alleyne, Haniffa, & Hudaib, 2019).
Moreover, the sample was gathered from a single university. Although the current study
focused on peer ethical behavior from the immediate social group, we acknowledge that
collecting data from different universities with diverse culture and norms would add to our
results.
There are also other opportunities for future research. In this work, we tested the joint
effects of individual and contextual factors in whistleblowing intentions, but we did not
measure actual reporting behavior. Therefore, collecting data from individuals who actually
witnessed misconduct and assessing whether they reported those unethical conducts would
be an interesting extension of the findings of this study. Additionally, we focused on the
mediating role of fear of retaliation to explain the relationship between peer behavior and
whistleblowing intentions. Future work could examine other mechanisms responsible for
this effect, such as psychological safety at the group level. Recent research has shown that
psychological safety, the shared belief by members of a group that is safe to take
interpersonal risks within this group (Edmondson, 1999), is an important antecedent of
silence at work (Sherf, Parke, & Isaakyan, 2020). As such, future studies could test whether
psychological safety could mediate the link between peer ethical behavior and the decision
to speak up in academic settings.
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